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Abstract 
This study investigates the extent of Malaysian directors remuneration disclosure in the annual reports 
based on individual pay for each director, band of pay, linkage to performance, and components of pay. 
The annual reports of 376 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are randomly selected and analysed. The 
results reveal that most of the sampled firms communicate information about the directors pay in bands 
of RM50,000, together with the narration of linkages between the directors pay and performance in their 
annual reports. However, not many companies disclose information about individual directors pay, or 
separately disclose the salary and bonus components.   
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
Jakarta   
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1.0 Introduction 
Director remuneration has become one of the prominent topics in contemporary corporate governance due 
to its controversial nature (Kabir, 2008; Conyon, 2006 and Hill, 2006).  The topic is controversial to the 
extent that it has been identified by various forums as a contributing factor to the global financial crisis. 
Previously, the controversial issue is whether the pay rewards to executives are consistent with 
shareholders interests. Then, the disclosure of directors remuneration has been highlighted. The issue of 
inappropriate disclosure of director remuneration is also experienced by Malaysian s shareholders as 
shown by numbers of anecdotal evidence (Shanmugam et al., 2003; Standard & Poor s, 2004; Thompson 
and Wah, 2004; MSWG-UiTM, 2007; MSWG, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2009; and Yeong, 2011).     
This research is significant for several reasons. First, the communication of directors remuneration 
promotes real transparency and is central to shareholders ability to exercise their ownership rights on an 
informed basis. Therefore, providing comprehensive and detailed remuneration information may mitigate 
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the information asymmetry issues between management and stakeholders. Second, it has been suggested 
by Ernst and Young (2009) that executive and board remuneration levels continue to increase in 
Malaysia. This phenomenon is crucial, especially to the shareholders, in ensuring that the executive 
director is reasonably paid according to their performance. Thus, this study seeks to examine the extent of 
compliance with the Listing and the Code with respect to executive remuneration disclosure in the annual 
reports.  
2.0 Dimension of directors remuneration  
The essential of requirements and guidelines in relation to director remuneration disclosure has seriously 
considered by many countries long ago.  In the UK, government put in force legislation on disclosure of 
directors remuneration known as Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, which came into 
force on 1 August 2002 (Sjberwin, 2002). Meanwhile in the US, the SEC Executive Compensation 
Disclosure Rules require that the reporting companies to provide investors with a clearer and more 
complete picture of remuneration. Reforms in executive remuneration also happened in Australia, when it 
became a central tenet in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004 (the CLERP 9 Act). These developments of corporate governance have also led to 
the establishment of a better disclosure system of director remuneration in Europe, Italy and Germany.  
In Malaysia, the Code as per Principle CIII, Part 1 and the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
(hereafter referred to as the Listing) as per Appendix 9c, Part A (10) makes it mandatory for companies to 
disclose remuneration information in their annual reports.  The Code emphasizes the disclosure of 
whether pay is linking to performance and the details of the remuneration of each director.  Whereas, the 
Listing requires companies  to disclose information on aggregate remuneration of directors with 
categorization into appropriate components (e.g., directors fees, salaries, percentages, bonuses, 
commission, compensation for loss of office, benefits in kind based on estimated money value) 
distinguishing between executive and non-executive directors. In addition, the Listing requires companies 
to disclose the number of directors whose remuneration falls in each successful band of RM50,000.  This 
information is expected to provide a basis for shareholders to evaluate whether the executives are 
excessively paid or not compared to their performance and the dividend received by the shareholders.  
3.0 Research methodology 
The annual report of year 2009 for 376 companied are analyzed.  The companies cover a wide range of 
industries including construction and properties, consumer products, industrial products, plantation, 
trading and others.  In relation to directors remuneration, the element of individual pay, the pay bands of 
RM50,000 of pay, the link of pay to performance, and the components of pay to the directors are 
investigated. These elements are developed based on the recommendations of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements.  
4.0 Findings 
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the individual pay (INDPAY) together with the related 
corporate governance variables (fraction of board independent, audit committee independence, 
remuneration independence, and percentage of block holder ownership) and firm characteristics (total 
assets and total revenue). It is found that 351 companies (93.35%) did not disclose individual pay for each 
director in their annual reports. It appears that company is not willing to communicate detail information 
of how much each individual director gets paid. Among these companies, on average, the percentage of 
independents director on the board of directors, audit committee and remuneration committee are 45%, 
87% and 69% respectively. This is consistent with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
recommendation to have majority independent directors on these committees. The average percentage of 
block holder ownership is 46.22%, with average total assets and revenue of approximately RM1.3 million 
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and RM700,000 respectively.  Further, about 6.65% of the sample (25 companies) provides individual 
pay for each of the director. For instance, if a company has 7 directors, the individual pay these 7 
directors is communicated in their annual reports. This disclosure incentive implies that the company is 
providing greater transparency to the readers of their annual reports. The percentage of independent 
directors on the board of director, audit committee and remuneration committee is similar to the 
counterpart (45%, 88% and 62%). In contrast, on average, these groups of companies are having higher 
total assets and revenue (approximately RM2.6 million and RM1.5 million).   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for individual pay   
INDPAY  Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
BRDIND (%) 0.22 0.83 0.45 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.67 
BLOCK (%) .00 88.32 46.22 47.55 
TOTALASSET (RM) 10,640 43,407,010 1,283,879.57 327,775 
NO 
(n=351, ) 
REVENUES (RM) 1,013 24,367,620 672,466.10 198,390 
BRDIND (%) 0.33 0.83 0.45 0.41 
ACIND (%) 0.67 1.00 0.88 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.13 1.00 0.62 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 6.70 81.87 54.98 58.78 
TOTALASSET (RM) 169,778 18,359,170 2,624,677.17 837,924 
YES 
(n=25) 
REVENUES (RM) 10,641 8,945,794 1,545,411.13 297,944 
Next, Table 2 depicts the descriptive result of the band (BAND). Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
require a listed company to disclose the number of directors whose remuneration falls in each successive 
band of RM50,000 (Para 15.25 (a) and Appendix 9c). From Table 2, about 68.88% of the companies (259 
companies) provide band of RM50,000 information for directors. This result indicates the sample 
companies adhere to the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements with aims to enhance transparency 
between management of the company and stakeholders. For these groups of company, on average the 
percentage of independent directors on the board of directors, audit committee and remuneration 
committee is 45%, 87% and 69% respectively. Further, about a quarter of the companies (24.47%) 
provide band (RM50,0000) information for some directors. The percentage of independent directors on 
the committees is similar the group of companies that provide band information for all of their directors. 
On the other hand, only 6.65% of the companies (25 companies) did not provide information of 
RM50,000 band of pay to their directors in the annual reports. These groups of companies are not 
complied with the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for band  
BAND  Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
BRDIND (%) 0.33 0.83 0.50 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 
NONE 
(n=25) 
RCIND (%) 0.13 1.00 0.60 0.67 
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BLOCK (%) 5.54 86.79 55.22 57.63 
TOTALASSET (RM) 64,175 11,844,320 2,121,279.36 699,643 
REVENUES (RM) 1,013 24,367,620 1,932,060.20 448,326 
BRDIND (%) 0.29 0.83 0.45 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.50 1.00 0.87 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 0.00 88.32 50.01 50.08 
TOTALASSET (RM) 37,021 36,752,930 1,657,445.49 342,889 
SOME 
(n=92) 
REVENUES (RM) 10,841 15,783,470 880,142.14 234,731 
BRDIND (%) 0.22 0.83 0.45 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.33 1.00 0.87 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 0.00 86.03 44.86 47.55 
TOTALASSET (RM) 10,640 43,407,010 1,202,335.04 331,034 
ALL 
(n=259) 
REVENUES (RM) 1,451 8,893,600 556,740.95 187,011 
Principle Part 1 B1 of corporate governance recommends that the remuneration of executive directors 
should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance. In addition, the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements require a listed company to make a narrative statement of how it has 
applied the principle. Thus, the LINK variable measures whether directors remuneration is linked to the 
performance. Table 3 provides information about the linkage between directors remuneration and 
performance. The finding shows that 63.83% of the companies (240 companies) linked the directors 
remuneration to the individual or companies performance. This is a good indication which implies 
companies are communicating more information about directors remuneration to the annual report 
readers. In contrast, about 36.17% of the companies (136 companies) did not link the remuneration paid 
to the directors to the individual or firm performance.   
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for linkage to performance  
LINK  Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
BRDIND (%) 0.22 0.83 0.46 0.44 
ACIND (%) 0.50 1.00 0.86 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 0.00 86.79 46.67 47.71 
TOTALASSET (RM) 14,975 43,407,010 1,506,403.20 313,070 
NO 
(n=136) 
REVENUES (RM) 1,451 24,367,620 785,070.65 206,336.50 
BRDIND (%) 0.25 0.83 0.45 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 
BLOCK (%) .00 88.32 46.88 49.73 
TOTALASSET (RM) 10,640 36,637,300 1,300,212.13 393,323 
YES 
(n=240) 
REVENUES (RM) 1,013 8,945,794 694,587 204,155.50 
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Table 4 displays the descriptive result for components of pay (COMP). This variable measures whether a 
company provides separate information between salary and bonus paid to their directors in the annual 
report. From the table, it shows that about 34% of the samples (128 companies) segregated the element of 
salary and bonus in the disclosure of directors remuneration. 248 companies (66%) pulled together the 
element of salary and bonus in the directors remuneration disclosure. Thus, it limits the information 
about detailed of remuneration paid to the directors  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for components of pay  
COMP  Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
BRDIND (%) 0.29 0.83 0.46 0.44 
ACIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 0.00 86.81 46.13 49.16 
TOTALASSET (RM) 10,640 43,407,010 1,467,746.86 298,757 
NO  
(n=248) 
REVENUES (RM) 1,013 24,367,620 748,217.84 168,386.50 
BRDIND (%) 0.22 0.83 0.43 0.43 
ACIND (%) 0.60 1.00 0.86 1.00 
RCIND (%) 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.67 
BLOCK (%) 0.00 88.32 48.10 47.20 
TOTALASSET (RM) 25,558 15,061,480 1,194,691.59 468,252.50 
YES 
(n=128) 
REVENUES (RM) 8,425 8,945,794 686,816.12 277,744 
Table 5 reports the significant difference between the means for disclosure and non-disclosure of 
directors remuneration information. The result of band is then transformed into two groups (none and 
some disclosure as 0, all disclosure as 1). it turns out to be 69% discloses all information required and 
31%  disclose none  and some information. For INDPAY, companies disclose INDPAY have more 
percentage of block holding ownership and more total assets which are significant at 5% and 1% 
respectively. In term of BAND, companies which disclose BAND are shown to have less block holding 
ownership (significant at 1%), less total assets (significant at 5%) and less total revenue (significant at 
10%). For LINK, companies disclose all bands have lower fraction of remuneration independence 
(significant at 10%) and more total assets (significant at 10%). Companies which disclose COMP have 
less fraction of board independence (significant at 5%), less fraction of remuneration independence 
(significant at 10%), more total assets (significant at 5%) and more revenues (significant at 1%). Overall, 
companies disclose all remuneration information have more total assets or larger companies. The result 
also shows that there is no significant difference in means for the fraction of audit committee in all 
remuneration dimensions.  
Table 5: Analysis of significant differences in means for all remuneration dimensions     
BRDIND ACIND RCIND BLOCK TOTALASSET REV 
0 0.4514 0.8663 0.6923 46.218 5.5679 5.3255 Mean  
1 0.4561 0.8807 0.6180 54.976 6.0001 5.5564 
INDPAY 
t-stat  -0.185 -0.483 1.288 -2.407** -3.675*** -1.391 
BAND Mean 0 0.4601 0.8594 0.6877 51.127 5.6999 5.4428 
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1 0.4479 0.8709 0.6872 44.846 5.5499 5.2949 
t-stat  0.900 -0.595 0.021 2.987*** 2.272** 1.911* 
0 0.4609 0.8611 0.7137 46.667 5.5218 5.2836 Mean  
1 0.4465 0.8708 0.6724 46.876 5.6390 5.3734 
LINK 
t-stat  1.126 -0.553 1.830* -0.104 -0.847* -0.283 
0 0.4604 0.8693 0.7016 46.131 5.5540 5.2695 Mean  
1 0.4350 0.8634 0.6598 48.097 5.6793 5.4791 
COMP 
t-stat  2.008** 0.336 1.756* -0.966 -2.053** -3.097*** 
Note:  Full disclosure denotes by 1, otherwise is 0. ***,**,* refer to significant at 1%, 5%,and 10% respectively  
5.0 Conclusion  
This study aims to explore the disclosure practices of directors remuneration in the annual reports. We 
analyze the 2009 annual reports of 376 firms listed of Bursa Malaysia. The remuneration disclosure is 
measured using four dimensions, namely the individual pay of directors, band of RM50,000 of pay, 
linkages of pay to the performance, and the separation of salary and bonus components to the directors. It 
can be concluded that less company is willing to provide information about individual pay and separation 
of salary and bonus components to the directors in their annual reports. However, more company 
communicated information about RM50,000 band and linkages of pay to performance.   From the 
findings, it is recommended for future research, the sample selection may be further clustered across 
industry and firm size. In addition, the latest Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2012) has just 
been released recently. Future research may refer to this code to investigate the issues of directors 
remuneration.  
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